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Resilience in Emergency Medical 
Dispatch: Big R and little r
Abstract
Emergency medical dispatch (EMD) is integral to 
emergency health care provision. It involves interaction 
between humans and computers and needs to be 
resilient to fluctuating demands. Here we investigate 
resilience in the London Ambulance Service control 
room. We find it useful to distinguish between Big R 
and little r, the former relating to strategy creation and 
the latter strategy sharing and reuse. Systems can be 
designed to allow for Big R responses to the 
unexpected. Little r can facilitate the efficiency, 
effectiveness and safety of more mundane tasks. This 
distinction can help research studies in resilience for 
other health care contexts.
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Introduction
Emergency medical dispatch (EMD) is on the front-line 
of emergency health care provision. Its effectiveness 
has direct consequences on patient outcome and 
quality of care. Emergency resources have to be 
directed to incidents in a timely fashion, but these 
resources are finite and demand for them can fluctuate 
greatly. This is especially pertinent for the London 
Ambulance Service (LAS) control room which handles 
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approximately 3,800 calls on a normal day [1]. In this 
paper we investigate the importance of different forms 
of resilience in the LAS control room. 
Background
Resilience Engineering is a relatively recent area of 
study which is contrasted with traditional approaches to 
safety [2]. The rhetoric suggests that resilience looks at 
building capacity to deal with the unexpected, whereas 
traditional safety looks to make the system robust and 
error free against predicted threats. Resilience is 
commonly associated with coping with beyond design-
basis events, i.e. rare and extreme events that systems 
are not designed to handle. A common example is the 
9/11 attack on New York which required a response to 
something that had never been experienced before. 
However, it has also been associated with more 
mundane interactions, error avoidance, mitigation and 
recovery [3]. 
We subscribe to the view that unexpected errors can 
occur even for mundane interaction, and there is a 
constant risk of making these sorts of slips and lapses, 
particularly where processes, tools and artefacts are 
designed poorly. People will often reuse strategies and 
work-arounds to compensate for these poor designs 
and circumstances, which we define as resilience at the 
little r level. This contrasts with the Big R level which 
involves the 'creation' of novel strategies to respond to 
a vulnerability or threat. So the crux of this distinction 
is on the scale of innovation rather than the scale or 
frequency of the threat. In the following analysis of the 
LAS control room we see that both are relevant, and 
extra clarity can be gained by keeping these two types 
of resilience distinct.
Resilience in the LAS control room
To investigate resilience in the LAS control room this 
analysis builds on prior work [3, 4, 5]. The novelty in 
this analysis is its focus on resilience and the distinction 
we use between Big R and little r.
Distinguishing between Big R and little r
This distinction concerns the leap from established 
strategies and actions. Big R is to do with the creation 
of a strategy, whereas little r is in the propagation and 
reuse of a strategy. For example, in a overly busy 
Emergency Department Big R resilience might involve 
creatively thinking of using the corridor to extend the 
department's capacity to accept patients [6]. However, 
Big R would be limited to that first creative step. In 
contrast, little r might involve the reuse of this strategy 
to increase capacity to cope with other peaks in 
demand; it might also involve sharing this strategy with 
other hospitals that might find it useful too.
Big R in the LAS control room
There are different modes of control in the LAS control 
room: (I) normal routine work, (II) transition to a 
major incident, and (III) where a major incident is 
declared [4]. These three levels signify an increase in 
seriousness and scale of the incident. For example, a 
terrorist attack, such as the 7th July bombings in 
London in 2005, would entail reconfiguring to (III) 
where a major incident is declared. This most extreme 
mode means that the team that was dealing with the 
escalating incident is moved to a separate room whilst 
another team takes over their normal duties. This frees 
the team's cognitive resources to focus on the incident, 
rather than juggling many different incidents. This team 
also has special communication and command lines 
which makes it more tightly integrated with the other 
emergency service' responses e.g. the fire-brigade and 
police. These reconfigurations in structure and resource 
allows the incident to be handled flexibly and resiliently, 
which is required as the incident is likely to be 
unexpected in type, detail and scale. This fits the 
observation that “you may not be able to design for the 
unexpected, but you can design to allow the 
unexpected” [7].
Big R relates to big innovation and these can also occur 
to address smaller needs, e.g. thinking of more efficient 
or less error prone ways of working. To facilitate this 
process a staff suggestion scheme was planned to be 
introduced to the LAS between 2000 and 2004.
Little r in the LAS control room
In [3] we described resilient markers that were evident 
in the LAS control room. These markers are at the little 
r level because they are part of ongoing activities, and 
strategy reuse, that dampen error and facilitate 
improved interaction. These work within and around the 
more formal design of the system; they are identified in 
five models [3]: 
(1) the physical model concerns itself with the 
layout of the control room; an example of 
resilience was the physical co-location of 
individuals which allowed colleagues an 
augmented awareness to prepare for oncoming 
demand and better joint working;
(2) the information flow model concerns itself with 
the structure of the task and its progress; an 
example of resilience was 'buffering' because 
the LAS staff were observed to hold on to 
information before passing it on to colleagues 
so they were not overloaded or unnecessarily 
interrupted; 
(3) the artefact model concerns itself with the 
design and use of equipment; an example of 
resilience was redundancy because a computer 
system and a paper based system ran side-by-
side in case the technology failed; 
(4) the social model concerns itself with the social 
structure in the system; an example of 
resilience was the social hierarchy because 
staff with more responsibility had greater 
experience through successive promotion so 
they could better anticipate and control what 
was going on and even fill in for others where 
needed; and 
(5) the evolutionary model concerns itself with the 
development of the socio-technical system over 
time; an example of resilience was that new 
technological opportunities were exploited to 
better cope with increasing demand from the 
environment.
Little r relates to little innovation and so will include the 
sharing of best practice and reuse of past strategies 
that had not been entirely thought of or prescribed by 
designers. For example, control room staff used their 
initiative to preempt the needs of serious incidents and 
send more resource straight away even though this did 
not fit the automated system or procedure. One 
example of this included a report of a construction 
worker falling from a great height. The worker could 
not be seen so his condition was classed as 'unknown' 
by the automated system, and procedure advised one 
vehicle to first attend to assess the situation. However, 
the dispatcher foresaw that one ambulance would not 
be adequate and sent more resource immediately.
Discussion
Resilience is a useful concept for understanding the 
performance in the LAS control room. Past performance 
measures have included shortening times to the most 
serious calls, reducing excessive utilisation of front-line 
ambulances, harnessing available technology, and 
making people more effective. Some of these very 
grounded measures demonstrate resilience e.g. having 
spare capacity in front-line ambulance use to absorb 
spikes in demand; however, resilience does not seem to 
be referred to explicitly. This may only be a issue when 
trade-offs are being made in services, especially where 
there is pressure on the service to be more efficient 
and effective as this can conflict with being more 
resilient, i.e. spare capacity to absorb peaks in demand 
may be reduced for efficiency gains.
A distinction between Big R and little r further refines a 
resilience view. The Big R involves innovation: 
reconfiguring to allow for responses to the unexpected 
and having processes to encourage new strategies to 
be heard and assessed. The little r involves reuse and 
sharing of strategies: to help to dampen error and 
provide a balance between working efficiently, 
effectively and safely.
Implications
The distinction between Big R and little r may be useful 
for other areas of research in health care. For example, 
we are planning a series of studies of resilient 
interaction with medical devices. These will be focused 
on the design of the devices, the vulnerabilities of the 
device coupled with the work context, and the positive 
strategies that clinicians have developed to work 
efficiently, effectively and safely with devices i.e. 
strategies that compensate for poor designs and poor 
circumstances. Big R will involve looking at how these 
strategies are created, and little r will involve how these 
strategies are shared and reused.
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